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This paper presents a method for measuring the causal effect of party control on fiscal 
policy  outcomes.  The  source  of  identifying  information  comes  from  an  institutional 
feature of the election system, namely that party control changes discontinuously at 50 
percent of the vote share, i.e., a party that receives more than 50 percent of the votes will 
be in office. The approach is applied to a very large panel data set from Swedish local 
governments, which offers a number of attractive features. The results show that there is 
large and significant party effect: on average, left-wing parties spend and tax 2.5 percent 
more  than  right-wing  governments.  The  party  effect  constitutes  1  percent  of  average 
municipality income, clearly a sizeable effect. 
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1. Introduction 
A long-standing issue in political economics is whether party control makes a difference 
in determining policy outcomes. While parties are often characterized as ideologically 
based  organization  with  distinct  agendas,  little  systematic  evidence support that party 
control  delivers  measurable  fiscal  policy  differences.
1  This  finding  is  perhaps  not 
surprising considering the prediction from the well-known median voter theorem that 
competition for votes will drive opposing parties to the ideal policies of the median voter 
and therefore equilibrium policies will be characterized only by the preferences of the 
median voter.
2 The mixed support of a measurable party difference should not, however, 
be  interpreted  that  party  control  does  not  matter  for  policy  outcomes  since  previous 
empirical work has not adequately addressed the problem of identifying a causal or a 
ceteris paribus relationship between party control and policy outcome.  
The  key  problem  of  estimating  the  causal  effect  is  that  is that parties are not 
randomly selected to govern political entities and therefore any correlation between party 
control and fiscal policy outcomes might be spurious.
3 In other words, since voters select 
parties  to  govern  there  may  be  a  self-selection  problem  due  to  unmeasured  voter 
preferences.
4  However,  if  we  could  randomize  parties  in  government  over  political 
entities we could in principle solve the selection problem since randomization assures 
that  there  is  no  systematic  difference  between  political  entities  with  governments  of 
various  stripes.  In  this  case,  the  average  difference  in  policy  outcomes  between  the 
entities with different party control is an unbiased estimate of the causal party effect. 
However, such an experiment would not be feasible since it would clash with our notion 
of  democracy.  Thus,  we  are left  with  drawing  inference  from non-experimental data. 
Even though we cannot conduct a randomized experiment we can still try to approximate 
                                                 
1 See Besley and Case (2002) for evidence from US states, Blais et al. (1993) for evidence from cross-
country and U.S. states, and Imbeau et al (2001) for a meta-analysis on OECD data. 
2 The prediction of convergence applies both two a two-party and a multi-party system, although it may be 
somewhat weaker in the latter case. See Osborne (1995) for overview and discussion of the literature. 
3 Faust and Irons (1999) criticize the empirical literature about partisan cycles in macroeconomic outcomes 
precisely on this point. They claim that there is little evidence that party control matter when econometric 
identification issues have been properly addressed.   2  
the evidence generated by a randomized experiment, namely to use a quasi-experiment or 
a natural experiment. In this paper, the source of identifying information of the party 
effect comes from an institutional feature of the election system, namely that party control 
changes discontinuously at 50 percent of the vote share. In other words, a political party 
that receives more than 50 percent of the votes will be in office. The distinctive feature of 
this  particular  type  of  quasi-experimental  design,  the  sharp  regression-discontinuity 
design,
 5 is that the variables that determine the assignment to “treatment” groups, i.e., 
different political parties holding office, are known and quantified. Here the vote share is 
the only systematic determinant of party control and therefore an unbiased estimate of the 
party effect is obtainable. The general attractiveness of this particular quasi-experiment in 
search for unbiased treatment effect rests on its close similarity to an ideal randomized 
experiment, that is, treatment (i.e., party control) is assigned randomly, conditional on the 
assignment  variable  (i.e.,  vote  share),  which  is  also  known  as  conditional  mean 
independence,  or  “selection  on  observables”  (Goldberger  1972,  Heckman  and  Robb 
1985).  
In this paper, I employ the sharp regression-discontinuity design on a data set from 
Swedish local governments. The use of this data set offers some attractive features in the 
search for a causal party effect. It is a large panel data set of 288 municipalities over a 21 
year  period  of  time  (1974-1994)  making  it  possible  to  use  actual,  i.e.,  rule-triggered, 
changes of party control as the source of identifying information of the party effect and 
thereby  avoiding  any  bias  associated  with  a  cross-section  regression-discontinuity 
method,  as  discussed  by  Hoxby  (2000).  Swedish  local  governments  are  also  very 
homogeneous. In particular, they operate within a common political framework and face 
the  same  institutional  setting.  Thus,  fiscal  policies  and  political  parties  are  quite 
comparable across political entities, which otherwise is a major obstacle in cross-country 
studies. The Swedish election system is also characterized by strong parties, making it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 The general selection problem is subject of an extensive literature. For example, see Heckman and Robb 
(1985) and Manski (1989). 
5 There are two types of regression-discontinuity designs: the sharp and the fuzzy design. In the sharp 
design, treatment is known to depend in a deterministic way on some observed variables, whereas in the 
fuzzy design there are also some unmeasured factors affecting selection into treatment. This paper deals 
only with the sharp design.   3  
possible to treat parties as unitary actors without having the additional complication of 
dealing with the impact from individual legislators on policy outcomes.
6 Swedish local 
governments  also  have  the  constitutional  right  of  self-government,  no  restrictions  on 
borrowing, and no balanced budget rules.
7 Moreover, only 20 percent of their income 
comes from grants, whereas the rest mostly comes from a proportional income tax, which 
each municipality can set freely. Thus, they have a large degree of freedom, which has 
resulted in quite large differences in fiscal policy outcomes across the local governments.
8 
The result of this paper show that left-wing parties spend and tax, on average, 2.5 
percent more than right-wing governments. The party effect constitutes 1 percent of the 
average municipality income, clearly a sizeable effect.
9 In addition, since Swedish local 
governments  raise  the  bulk  of  their  revenues  through  a  proportional  income  tax,  the 
excess burden associated with such a distortionary tax is probably non-negligible.
10 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the problem of identifying 
a causal relationship between party control and policy outcomes and discusses the sharp 
regression-discontinuity design as a possible solution. Section 3 describes the data, while 
section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses the interpretations of the findings and 
section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
6 There is a literature in American politics addressing a related question of party effects, but this literature 
looks at measures of legislative voting outcomes, i.e., roll call votes, instead of fiscal policy outcomes. This 
literature  also  deals  with  the  complexity  of  separating  individual  legislators  characteristics  from  party 
effects. The literature addressing this question is voluminous: Levitt (1996), Snyder and Groseclose (2000) 
and McCarty et al. (2001) are good examples of recent work. For the older literature, see Levitt (1996) and 
the references cited therein. There is still a debate whether there is a causal relationship between party 
control and roll-call votes. 
7 However, as from 1998 there is a balanced budget rule in place.  
8 In a series of papers of mine, Pettersson-Lidbom (2001, 2002, 2003) and Pettersson-Lidbom and Dahlberg 
(2003), I also find strong support for Swedish local policy discretion. 
9 It is difficult to compare the size of the estimates of party effects across studies since neither of the 
previous studies has been able to convincingly identify a causal effect. Nevertheless, the size of the party 
effect  in  this  paper  is  still  much  larger.  For  example,  Besley  and  Case  (1995)  find  that  Democratic 
governors increase spending and taxes with less than 0.1 percent of average state income as compared to 
Republican governors.  
10  According  to  Barro’s  (1979)  “tax-smoothing”  hypothesis,  the  tax  rates  should  be  held  constant  to 
minimize the excess burden.   4  
2. The regression-discontinuity method and party control 
How can we test whether party control has a causal effect on fiscal policy outcomes? An 
experiment  would  be  the  gold  standard-standard  to  establish  causality.  Parties  in 
government would be randomly assigned to a large number of political entities and the 
average difference in policy outcomes between the entities with left-wing and right-wing 
governments would be interpreted as the causal effect of parties. We would be able to 
make this casual statement because randomization would make the party control variable 
independent of other variables which also might be related to policy outcomes such as 
voter preferences. However, it would not be possible to conduct such an experiment since 
it would clash with our notion of democracy, i.e., voters elect parties to govern. If we 
cannot make a randomized trial we can at least try to approximate one. This is the idea 
behind  the  quasi-experimental  research  design  employed  here:  the  sharp  regression-
discontinuity design.
11 The general idea of sharp the regression-discontinuity approach is 
that a known rule influences how subjects are assigned to treatment groups. In our context 
the vote share is the deterministic rule that assigns parties to political entities. If one party 
receives more than 50 percent of the votes it will be in office. Thus, party controls are the 
different  “treatments”,  which  the  political  entities will be assigned to. Since the vote 
share is the only systematic determinant of treatment status an unbiased estimate of the 
party effect may be obtained. The regression-discontinuity design can be formalized as 
follows.  
Consider a causal model that links some policy outcome Pi in a political unit i to a 
treatment indicator Ti, equal to one if the there is left-wing party in office in unit i and 
zero if there is a right-wing party in office instead.
12 Let ei be any other variable that may 
be  related  to  both  the  treatment  and  the  policy  outcome  variable.  We  now  have  the 
following policy outcome equation: 
                                                 
11 Thistlethwaite and Cambell (1960) is the first paper that introduces the sharp regression-discontinuity 
design. Its statistical properties, however, was first discussed formally by Goldberger (1972) using a linear 
set up. Later, Rubin (1977) and Heckman and Robb (1985) both have formal discussions of more general 
specifications.  More  recently,  Hahn  et  al.  (2001)  discuss  an  alternative  minimal  parametric  estimation 
methods in the regression-discontinuity design 
12 For expositional clarity, there are only two treatments groups, but the regression-discontinuity design can 
deal with many treatment groups as well.   5  
  Pi = a + dTi + ei              (1) 
where the parameter d measures the causal party effect,
13 i.e., the average difference in 
policy outcomes between left- and right-wing parties holding all other factors fixed. The 
key identifying assumption is that without any treatment, the party effect d would be zero, 
which formally is expressed as zero conditional mean: E[ei | Ti] = 0 . However, the zero 
conditional mean assumption will typically not hold, in particular because Ti is almost 
certainly  correlated  with  voter  preferences  since  party  control  will  depend  on  voters’ 
choices. However, we can use information about the selection into treatment to get an 
unbiased  measure  of  the  party  effect.  We  know  that  the  vote  share  is  the  sole 
deterministic variable that assigns a party to a political unit. If one party receives more 
than 50 percent of the vote share it will be in office. In other words, there is going to be 
two distinct treatment groups (Left-wing party: Ti =1) and (Right-wing party Ti =0) solely 
on the basis of whether assignment variable vi is below or above the 50 percent cutoff. 
The assignment or selection rule can formally be expressed as Ti=T(vi) =1[vi ￿50], where 
1[.] is an indicator function. Since Ti is a nonrandom function of vi, then the error term ei 
in equation (1) will be mean independent of Ti, conditional on vi. In other words, the 
sharp  regression  discontinuity  method  builds  on  the  conditional  mean  independence 
assumption,  i.e.,  E[ei  |Ti,  vi]  =  E[ei  |  vi].
14 Under  the  conditional  mean  independence 
assumption,  the  observed  or  unobserved  characteristics  in  the  error  term  vi,  may  be 
correlated with vi, but given vi the conditional mean of the error term ei does not depend 
on the treatment Ti. In this case, the parameter d will be the causal effect of party control, 
that is, the difference in conditional expectations: E(Pi| Ti =1, vi)- E(Pi| Ti =0, vi). This 
difference is also the causal effect defined by the experiment where the political units 
with a given vote share vi are randomly assigned to left-wing and right-wing majorities. 
Since the causal party effect does not depend on vi,
15 it is also the causal effect of party 
control  for  a  randomly  selected  political  unit  of  the  population.  In  other  words,  the 
                                                 
13 I have here invoked the assumption of a constant-coefficients regression model, namely that the party 
effect  is  the  same  across  municipalities.  Below,  I  discuss how  regression-discontinuity  set  up  must  be 
changed when this assumption does not hold. 
14  Conditional  mean  independence  is  also  known  as  “selection  on  observables”  or  “ignorability  of 
treatment”   6  
regression discontinuity method mimics an ideal randomized experiment and therefore 
we can get an unbiased estimate of the true causal party effect. 
    One approach to estimate the party effect is to specify and include the conditional 
mean function f(vi)=E[ei | vi] as a “control function” in equation (1) (Goldberger 1972, 
Heckman and Robb 1985). For example, when the population conditional mean function 
is linear, the equation to be fitted is: 
Pi= a + dTi + qvi + ei                                                                            (2) 
The inclusion of vote share vi as a regressor will now free Ti from the contamination 
which leads to selection bias since it will capture any correlation between Ti and ei, and 
therefore d will be an unbiased measure of the party effect. However, we do not know if 
the population conditional mean function is linear. A common approach is therefore to 
specify  a  flexible  parametric  control  function  as  to  avoid  functional  form 
misspecification.  However,  if  we  include  a  too  flexible  functional  form,  the  control 
function  will  have  sharp  jumps  or  “spikes”,  which  will  create  a  problem  for  the 
regression-discontinuity  method  because  the  identifying  variation  for  estimating  the 
treatment effect comes from the discontinuities that the assignment rule induces at certain 
known values. Therefore, we must assume that there is a smooth relationship between the 
assignment variable (i.e., vote share) and the outcome of interest (i.e., policy outcome), 
otherwise the treatment effect (i.e., party effect) would not be identifiable.
16  
  A second method is to restrict the data around the point of discontinuity (i.e., 
around 50 percent of the vote shares) to circumvent the problem of having to rely on 
functional form assumptions about the control function in identifying the party effect. 
This approach could, however, produce very imprecise measures of the party effect since 
the regression-discontinuity method is subject to a large degree of sampling variability.
17  
                                                                                                                                                 
15 This is true if the party effect is constant. 
16 That continuity is a requirement for identification in the regression-discontinuity approach is discussed by 
Hahn et al (2001). 
17 The regression discontinuity method is a correlated design, which implies that the standard errors will be 
larger than compared to an uncorrelated design, i.e., a randomized experiment. The larger is the correlation 
between the control function and the treatment indicator the larger is the variance of any estimates of the 
treatment effect. In other words, much more observations are needed in the regression-discontinuity design 
to  give  the  same  precision  as  in  an  experiment.  A  detailed  discussion  of  efficiency  of  the  regression-
discontinuity method is provided in Goldberger (1972)   7  
  Hence,  when  using  the  regression  discontinuity  method  in  practice,  there  is  a 
trade-off between bias and efficiency. However, by employing both methods we can get a 
sense whether the control function approach produces biased estimates of the treatment 
effect by comparing the estimates across the two methods, and if the estimates are similar 
we can base our inference on the control function approach since it is more efficient. 
  Another issue when implementing the regression-discontinuity method is raised 
by Hoxby (2000). She argues that the regression-discontinuity method based on cross-
section data may lead to biased estimates unless the data used in the estimation is based 
solely on the discontinuity, i.e., those observations precisely at 50 % of the vote share. 
Her  recommendation  is  instead  to  use  the  observations  where there  has  been  a  rule-
triggered change in the variable of interest, namely when there is an observed change in 
party control. Since my data is a panel, I can implement her suggestion by using only the 
within-municipality variation to identify the party effect. This is equivalent of including 
an  individual  intercept  for  each  municipality,  that  is,  a  fixed-municipality  effect 
specification. In addition, I will also include a full set of time dummies since I do not 
want to attribute behavioral significance to any across-municipality correlations that are 
really due to common national influences such as the effect of the national business cycle. 
In principle, as discussed above, there is no need to include additional covariates 
in  the  regression-discontinuity  approach  other  than  the  control  function.  In  practice, 
however,  there  may  still  be  reasons  for  including  other  regressors.  First,  there  is  an 
efficiency reason for including additional covariates since it reduces the variance of the 
error term, which could be quite important since the regression-discontinuity method has 
large sampling variability. For example, if there are some unobserved determinants of 
policy outcome that are persistent over time for a given municipality, including fixed-
municipality effects, would enhance efficiency.
18 Second, even if we could conduct a 
randomized experiment of party control there still may be a need to include additional 
controls since the randomization could be less than perfect in the sample at hand. Thus, 
bias is always a potential issue even in a randomized experiment. However, here it is   8  
important not to include experimental outcomes as additional covariates since these will 
bias  the  estimate  of  the  treatment  effect.  (Rosenbaum  1984)  For  example,  including 
lagged values of policy outcomes among the control variables is not advisable since these 
variables are affected by the treatment (party control) themselves. Thus, one should only 
include  pretreatment  characteristics,  which  are  not  influenced  by  the  experimental 
treatment. Third, we can assess whether the estimate of the treatment or party effect is 
sensitive to inclusion of any observable pretreatment variable. Since party control should 
be as good as randomly assigned (conditional on the control function), the inclusion of 
additional covariates should not have a significant influence on the estimate of the party 
effect. In other words, this is an empirical test for random receipt of treatment.  
Another important issue in this sharp regression-discontinuity approach is there 
must be perfect assignment of treatments relative to the cutoff point. Otherwise, we must 
use a modified version of the regression-discontinuity approach.
19 
Finally,  to  avoid  any  misunderstanding  in  the  interpretation  of  the  regression-
discontinuity method, it is very important to point out that it is only the party effect d that 
has any causal interpretation. For example, in equation (2) the estimate of q typically has 
no causal interpretation since under the conditional mean assumption; the vote share is 
allowed to be correlated with the error term. In other words, the vote share only plays the 
role of an assignment variable for treatment in the regression-discontinuity method and it 
is  therefore  incorrect  to  interpret  the  regression  discontinuity  method  as  solving  the 
selection problem caused by unmeasured voter preferences by including the vote share as 
a proxy for these preferences. In fact, if one addressed the selection bias problem by using 
a proxy variable of voter preferences, such as a survey-based measure of public opinion,
20 
this approach would not lead to an unbiased measure of the party effect.  
                                                                                                                                                 
18 The R
2 from OLS regressions on the policy outcomes used in the empirical analysis and the fixed-
municipality effects are in the range of 0.46 to 0.60. In other words, the municipality fixed effects explains a 
large amount of the variation in the policies. 
19 This is the fuzzy regression-discontinuity design explored by Angrist and Lavy (1999), Van der Klaauw 
(2002), and Pettersson-Lidbom (2003) among others.  
20 For example, Erikson et al. (1993) use a proxy variable method.   9  
3. The data  
To test whether party control matters for fiscal policy outcomes I will use a quite a large 
panel data set from Swedish local governments, but before turning to the description of 
the  data  it  is  perhaps  helpful  to  digress  briefly  on  the  workings  of  Swedish  local 
governments. Sweden is currently divided into 290 local governments (or municipalities), 
which cover the entire country. Local governments play an important role in the Swedish 
economy,  both  in  terms  of  the  allocation  of  functions  among  different  levels  of 
government  and  economic  significance.  They  are,  for  example,  responsible  for  the 
provision  of  day  care,  education,  care  of  the  elderly,  and  social  welfare  services. To 
quantify  their  economic  importance,  note  that  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  their  share  of 
spending out of GDP was in the range 20 to 25 percent and they employed roughly 20 
percent of the total Swedish workforce. Swedish local governments also have a large 
degree of autonomy. They have the constitutional right of self-government, they have no 
restrictions on borrowing, and they have no balanced budget rules.
21 Moreover, during the 
period of investigation 1974-1994, the bulk of revenues were raised trough a proportional 
income tax, which each municipality was allowed to set freely,
22 and only 20 percent of 
the total revenues came from intergovernmental grants.  
To  implement  the  sharp  regression-discontinuity  method  the  mechanics  of 
Swedish election system need to be discussed in some detail. The election schedule is 
fixed and elections were held every third year on the third Sunday of September during 
the sample period.
23 During the same period, voter turnout has been very high, close to 90 
percent, in the local elections. The decision-making body in each of the municipalities is 
an elected municipal council and the Swedish Elections Act prescribes that in elections to 
municipal council seats should be distributed proportionally between parties on the basis 
of election results in each constituency, where the distribution is based on the adjusted 
odd-number method. As a result, the election system is entirely party based,
  i.e., a closed-
                                                 
21 As from year 2000 there is a balanced budget rule.  
22 From 1991 to 1993, however, the central government imposed a temporary tax cap.  
23 As from 1994, elections are held every fourth year.   10  
list system, and with the existence of several political parties.
24 The multi-party issue 
raises the question of how to define treatment or party control. However, the Swedish 
political map has been characterized by a very clear dividing line between socialist and 
non-socialist  parties  leading  to  a  quite  stable  two-bloc  system.
25    Hence,  to  a  first 
approximation we can treat the Swedish electoral system as bipartisan,
26 and define the 
treatment indicator Ti as 1 for left wing majorities and zero otherwise.
27 The party effect 
should thus more accurately be addressed as a majority coalition effect, but for simplicity 
I retain the former name. The multi-party feature of the political system also raises the 
issue of heterogeneous party or treatment effects. Implicitly, I have assumed a constant 
coefficient  model  in  equations  1  and  2,  namely  the  party  effect  is  the  same  across 
municipalities. In other words, the assumption is that the party effect is the same for, say, 
a left-wing majority with a 10-41 votes share split for (the smaller) Leftist and (the larger) 
Social Democratic Party, as with a 25-26 split between the parties.
28 Thus, inter coalition 
bargain  does  not  depend  on  the  included  parties  relative  vote  shares.  However,  the 
constant party effect assumption is an empirical issue that can be tested by allowing for 
interactions between the party control variable and the control function in the regressions. 
However, in the case of varying party effects there is no single party effect, since the 
impact is conditional on the control function. One option is to report the local average 
treatment effect, i.e., the party effect for those at the margin or 50 percent of the vote 
                                                 
24 Whether proportional election system is a cause of the multitude of parties or whether the number of 
parties is caused by a heterogeneous distribution of voter preferences is still in dispute. 
25 To the best of my knowledge, there is no evidence that any of the socialist parties did form a coalition 
with any of the non-socialist parties or vice versa during the sample period 1974 to 1994. That this was not 
the case was checked extensively against the official newspaper (www.kommunaktuellt.com) of Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities, an association of all Sweden’s municipalities. This newspaper gives a 
quite detailed coverage of local politics. 
26 For example, Alesina et al. (1997) also classify Sweden as a bipartisan system (along with U.S. and other 
political system with a clear left-right division) in their empirical analysis.  
27 The classification is taken from the official newspaper of the Swedish Association of Local Authorities. 
The  socialist  bloc  includes  the  Leftist  Party  and  the  Social  Democratic  Party.  The  non-socialist  bloc 
includes three parties: the Conservative Party, the Centrist Party and the Liberal Party. However, since 1988 
it includes a fourth party: the Christian Democratic Party. In the 1991 election a fifth party was included in 
the non-socialist bloc: the New Democratic Party.  
28 Out of the total of 826 cases which are defined as having a left wing government, the Social Democratic 
Party  had  own  party  control  515 times, while the Leftist Party never had a majority of the seats. For 
government controlled by the right wing parties, there are only in 6 out of the total of 833 cases where a 
single party controlled the government.   11  
shares,
29 while another option is to report the average treatment effect, namely the party 
effect at the mean of the assignment variable.
30 If there is a constant party effect, the same 
results follows from either procedure. As it turns out, the results presented in this paper 
do not reject a constant party effect.   
There are also two caveats with my data that need to be mentioned. A first caveat 
is that in a few cases where the vote share is less than 50 percent for a bloc, but it is still 
in  power.  This  oddity  arises  as  the  distribution  of  seats  is  not  based  on  strict 
proportionality but on the previously mentioned adjusted odd-number method. To avoid 
the problem of misclassifying party control or treatments, I will use the seat share instead 
of the vote share. In practice, however, using seats shares instead of vote shares will 
probably make little difference since this problem has happened only 4 times during the 
sample period and the correlation between vote and seat shares is larger than 0.99. 
A second caveat possibly more important is the existence of several small parties -
often one-issue parties- at the local level, which are not part of the two blocs. These 
parties sometimes hold the balance of power, which creates a problem of defining party 
control since these are not easily classified along the left-right ideological spectrum. I call 
these  kinds  of  constellations  undefined  majorities.
31  The  problem  with  undefined 
majorities, however, can be solved by the including a separate dummy variable for the 
undefined majority together with an additional control function, i.e., f(ri) = E[ei | ri] where 
ri  is  vote  share  of  the  right-wing  majority.  The  party  effect  will  now  be  correctly 
identified  as  the  average  difference  in  policy  outcomes  between  left  and  right  wing 
majorities.
32  
Table 1 summarizes the number of left, right wing and undefined governments in 
every election period during the sample period 1974-1994. There was a left-wing majority 
                                                 
29 Hahn et al (2001) shows that when the treatment effects are heterogenous, the average treatment effect at 
the margin is non-parametrically identified under a functional form restriction and weak form of conditional 
independence. To estimate this effect we modify (2) as Pi= a + dmTi + q1vi + q2(vi –50) + ei, where dm 
measures the average treatment effect at 50 percent of the vote shares. 
30 To estimate the average treatment effect in case of varying treatment effects we modify (2) as Pi= a + 
daTi + q1vi + q2(vi –E(v))+ ei, where da measures the effect at the mean of the assignment variable E(v). 
31 This classification is compiled from the distribution of seats in local councils. If either of the blocs 
receives more than 50 percent of the seats it is defined accordingly, otherwise it is classified as undefined.   12  
in 826 cases, and a right-wing majority in 833 cases. Thus, the two blocs have been in 
power almost the same number of times.
33 Table 1 also shows that there has been an 
undefined majority in 312 cases, which corresponds to 15 % of all observations. Table 2 
shows  the  frequency  of  government  changes  for  the  municipalities.  The  number  of 
government changes is very unequally dispersed among the different municipalities. For 
example, 122 municipalities (42 percent of the sample) had no change of power (69 had 
left  wing  and  45  right  wing  governments).  It  is  important  to  stress  that  the  122 
municipalities with zero turnovers will not be part of identifying the party effect since 
only the within-municipality variation will be used, as was discussed in section 2. Table 2 
also shows the vote share for the incumbent in each group of municipalities.
34 Incumbents 
in  those  municipalities  with  no  change  of  power  on  average  obtained  more  than  62 
percent of the votes while those who had 3 or more changes got less than 54 percent.  
Turning to the policy outcome variables, four different variables will be used in 
the empirical analysis: total expenditures, current expenditures, total revenues and the 
proportional income tax rate. The difference between total and current expenditures is 
mainly that investments are included in the former. Roughly 85 percent of total spending 
is classified as current spending. Total revenues include tax receipt from a proportional 
income tax rate, fees, and governmental grants. Since total revenues might reflect non-
discretionary  local  government  decisions,  a  more  discretionary  measure  is  to  use  the 
proportional income tax itself. On average, about 55 % of the total revenues come from 
the income tax. Expenditures, current expenditures, and the total revenues are expressed 
in per capita terms and in 1991 prices and the tax rate is expressed in percent.
35 Table 1 
presents  summary  statistics  for  the  four  dependent  variables.  This  table  shows  a 
considerable variation in total spending and revenues. For example, real expenditure per 
capita was on average SEK 28,527 ($ 4755), the standard deviation 5,804 ($ 967), the 
                                                                                                                                                 
32 Another approach would be to exclude these observations from analysis altogether. It turns out that it 
does not matter which of these two approaches I use for the results about the party effect presented below. 
33 This is perhaps surprising given the social democratic party hegemony at the national level. 
34 The vote share is compiled from the distribution of seats in local councils. However, because the Swedish 
electoral system is based on proportional representation, vote shares are almost equivalent to seat shares. 
For example, in the 1994 election the simple correlation between vote and seat shares was larger than 0.99. 
35 I have used the implicit GDP deflator. The deflator is constructed by taking the ratio of GDP at current 
market prices to GDP at fixed market prices.   13  
minimum value 14,392 ($ 2,400), and maximum value 70,032 ($ 11,672).
36 Table 1 also 
presents summary statistics for covariates considered a standard set of controls in the 
local public finance literature: proportion of people of age 0 to 15, proportion of people 
older than 65, population size, population density, income, and grants-in-aid.
37  
All the data used are publicly available and were obtained from Statistics Sweden 
(SCB) or its publications.
38 
4. Results 
In this section I present empirical evidence regarding the party effect. As discussed in 
section 2, two different approaches will be used. First, I present results from the control 
function approach including various polynomials of the vote share as covariates together 
with the party control variable. This approach will give an unbiased estimate of the party 
effect unless the control function is misspecified. Second, I show the results from the 
approach of restricting the sample around the point of discontinuity of party control, i.e., 
around 50 percent of the votes. In this way we can avoid bias due to the misspecification 
of the control function. Nevertheless, this approach has a drawback, namely the party 
effect will be less precisely measured due to the large sampling variability associated with 
the regression-discontinuity method. However, if the estimates are similar across the two 
methods we can rather safely base the inference on the control function approach since 
this suggests that the estimate of the party effect is likely to be unbiased in this case. 
A. Control function  
I present empirical evidence of the party effect using the control function approach. As 
discussed in section 2, all regressions include fixed municipality and time effects. The 
reason for including fixed effects is to avoid the potential bias associated with cross-
                                                 
36  The  expenditures  are  expressed  in  1991  prices  using  the  implicit  GDP  deflator.  The  deflator  is 
constructed  by  taking  the  ratio  of  GDP  at  current  market  prices  to  GDP  at  fixed  market  prices.  The 
equivalent amount in 1991 dollars (i.e., SEK 6=$1) is shown within parentheses. 
37 One can argue whether grants in general are exogenous with respect to fiscal decisions: matching grants 
are typically not, whereas grant in aid are more likely to be this. In the Swedish case (until 1993), about 80 
percent of the total grants were matching grants while 20 percent were grant-in-aid. Even the grant-in-aid 
program was to some extent determined by the fiscal behavior of the municipalities.  
38 The publications used are: How much do local public services cost in Sweden, Local government finance, 
and Statistical yearbook of administrative districts of Sweden.    14  
section regression-discontinuity method since the party effect will now only be identified 
when a municipality has had at least one change of power, and time effects will pick any 
across-municipality  correlations  in  policy  that  are  really  due  to  common  national 
influences, such as national business cycle and changes in the definition of the dependent 
variables.
39 Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 shows the results from party control on four measures of 
fiscal  policy  outcomes:  total  spending,  current  spending,  total  revenues  and  the 
proportional  income  tax  rate.  Column  I  in  each  of  the  tables  show  the  results  from 
specifications without a control function, whereas columns II to V present the results 
from a linear, quadratic, cubic, and quartic in vote shares respectively. Table 4 shows that 
total spending is significantly higher for left-wing governments than right wing for all 
specifications.
40  The  size  of  the  party  effect  is  quite  similar  across the  specifications 
expect for the regression without a control function. The estimated party effect is in the 
range 500-700 per capita for spending for the specifications including control functions as 
shown  in  columns III to VI. These effects are in the order of 2-2.5 percent of mean 
spending  (i.e.,  SEK  28,257  per  capita),  which  constitute  about  1  percent  of  average 
municipality income (i.e., SEK 72624 per capita). From Table 4 we can also make two 
additional observations. First, the estimate of the party effect without a control function in 
column II is roughly twice as large compared to the others estimates. Thus, half of this 
estimate of the party effect is a selection effect. This implies that including fixed effects is 
not sufficient to control for selection bias. Second, the size of party effect seems to be 
quite stable across the different specifications of the control function. Therefore, a linear 
specification  seems  to  be  a  good  approximation  of  the  population  conditional  mean 
function.  
Turning to the other policy outcomes: current spending, total revenues, and the 
proportional income tax rate, we get a quite similar picture. In all specifications there are 
positive and statistically significantly party effects. The estimate for the party effect is in 
                                                 
39 Including time effects are important since Statistics Sweden has changed the definition of expenditures 
and revenues over time. 
40 I follow the usual approach of reporting Huber-White robust standard errors. However, because there 
could  be  serial  dependence  in  the  errors  withinin  municipalities,  I  also  report  (in  brackets)  the  more 
conservative Huber-White standard errors clustered at the municipality level following the suggestions of 
Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainahtan (2002) and Kézdi (2002).   15  
range SEK500-750 per capita for current spending (i.e., columns III to IV in Table 5), in 
the range SEK 400-650 per capita for total revenues (i.e., columns III to IV in Table 6), 
and in the range 10-13 % for the income tax rate (i.e., columns III to IV in Table 7), 
which is almost 1 percentage points, given an average tax rate of 16.46 percent. The 
various estimates of the party effect without including a control function are at least twice 
as  large  then  the  one  with  control  functions  and  reinforce  the  previous  finding  of 
substantial  selection  bias.  Once  again,  a  linear  specification  seems  to  be  a  good 
approximation of the population conditional mean function.  
As was discussed in section 2, there might be practical reasons to include other 
pretreatment  covariates  than  the  assignment  variable  in  the  regression-discontinuity 
design since this can enhance efficiency and allow for a test of randomization of party 
control  since  the  underlying  assumption  is  that  the  party  control  should  not  be 
systematically  related  to  any  observed  or  unobserved  variables  once  the  assignment 
variable is controlled for. Thus, party control should be as good as randomly assigned 
conditional  on  the  assignment  variable.  Table  8  presents  the  results  from  the  same 
regressions  as  in  Tables  4-7  except  for  the  inclusion  of  the  additional  covariates: 
proportion of people of age 0 to 15, proportion of people older than 65, population size, 
population density, income, income lagged twice,
41 and grants-in-aid. Table 8 reveals that 
by adding additional covariates, this does not significantly affect any of estimates of party 
control as compared to the corresponding estimates in Tables 4-7, giving further support 
of a causal interpretation of the measured party effect. As expected, the party effect is also 
more precisely measured in Table 8 than in the previous tables. Moreover, almost all the 
estimates of the party effect is even significant at the 5 percent level when the more 
conservative estimates of the standard errors (in brackets) are used for testing the null 
hypothesis of no effect. 
So far we have assumed a constant party effect, but it may not be correct since 
both treatments groups, i.e., left wing and right wing governments, consists of several 
parties and the bargain within a coalition government may depend on the relative strength   16  
of the included parties. But as was discussed in section 3, we can relax this assumption by 
allowing  for  interactions  between  the  control  function  and  party  control  variable. 
However, in the case of varying party effects there is no single party effect, since the 
treatment effects will be conditional on the control function. One option is to report the 
local average effect, i.e., the party effect for those at the margin or at 50 percent of the 
votes, while another option is to report the average treatment effect, namely the party 
effect at the mean of the assignment variable. If there is a constant party effect, the same 
results  follows  from  either  procedure.  Table  9  presents  the  results  from  including 
interactions. For ease of comparison, the first row restates the results from column II in 
Table 8, while the second and third rows present the results at the margin of 50 percent 
and at the mean of vote share respectively. The estimates of party effect in the first row 
provide a benchmark for assessing whether the assumption of a constant party effect is 
reasonable  and  therefore  these  estimates  should  be  compared  to  the  corresponding 
estimates from the next two rows. If the party effect is constant, these estimates should be 
similar (except for sampling variability). For example, for total spending the party effect 
estimates across the different specifications with additional covariates are 690, 665 and 
854. For current spending the corresponding estimates are 701, 705, and 703; for total 
revenues the estimates are 654, 619, and 872; and for taxes the estimates are 0.135, 0.130, 
and 0.172. These estimates are quite similar across the different specifications within 
each  policy  category,  although  they  tend  to  be  somewhat  larger  for  the  interaction 
specification  evaluated  at  the  mean  of  vote  shares.  In  any  case,  these  estimates  are 
statistically indistinguishable from each other. Thus, the assumption of a constant party 
effect cannot be rejected. 
To summarize, using the control function approach we find statistically significant 
party effects: left wing governments spend and tax more than right wing governments. 
The size of the party effect is also quite large: on average left-wing governments increase 
both spending and revenues with roughly 2.5 percent, which constitute about 1 percent of 
average municipality income. The party effect is also quite robust to the parameterization 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Due to centralization of tax collection, the tax receipts to the local governments in year t are based on the 
taxable personal income in year t-2. I have tried to deal with this feature by including both the average   17  
of  the  control  function,  which  suggests  that  a  linear  control  function  is  a  good 
approximation to the true conditional mean function. However, to probe this issue further 
we turn to the other approach of restricting the sample around the discontinuity. 
B. Discontinuity samples 
In the regression-discontinuity method, the source of identifying information of the party 
effect comes from the discontinuity that the electoral rule induces at 50 percent of the 
vote share. The idea is that observations close to the cutoff are more representative of a 
random experiment and therefore any misspecification of the control function might be 
avoided. However, restricting the sample comes at a cost, namely that the party effect will 
be less precisely measured, as discussed in section 2. I will present results from a number 
of subsamples. I start by restricting 5 percentage points around the discontinuity, i.e., in 
the interval [45, 55]. Then I decrease the interval down to 1 percentage point, i.e., [49, 
51].  Here  it  is  important  to  point  out  that  municipality  and  time  specific  effects  are 
included in all discontinuity-sample regressions. Therefore, and analogous to the previous 
control  function  approach,  the  party  effect  will  only  be  identified  from  the  within-
municipality  variation, that  is,  when  there  has been electoral rule-triggered change in 
party control.  
Table 10 presents the results from this approach, but it also gives information 
about the number of municipalities in each discontinuity sample together with the average 
number of observations per municipality. For example, Table 10 reveals that in the +5/-5 
interval  there  are  132  municipalities  with  an  average  of  10.2  observations  per 
municipality, while there are only 26 municipalities included in the +1.0/-1.0 interval 
with an average of 4.2 observations per municipality. For total spending Table 10 shows 
the party effect varies in the range SEK 350-1,150 per capita, but the standard errors are 
also quite large. For example, the standard errors in regressions on total spending are 3 
times larger or more than in the control function approach. This finding illustrates the 
large sampling variability associated with the regression discontinuity method, as was 
discussed in section 2. The large standard errors imply that we cannot reject that these 
                                                                                                                                                 
municipality income in year t and t-2 as covariates.   18  
estimates of party effect is significantly different from the ones in the control function 
approach,  which  are  in  the  range  SEK  500-700  per  capita.  We  can  make  the  same 
conclusion for the other policy outcomes as well: the party effect is in the range of SEK 
450-1,350 per capita for current spending, in the range of SEK 200-1,200 per capita for 
total revenues, and 9-56 percentage points for the tax rate. However, the party effects are 
not  statistically  significantly  different  from  the  counterparts  in  the  control  function 
approach.  Thus,  this  finding  suggests  the  functional  form  of  the  conditional  mean 
function  is  reasonably  specified  in  the  control  function  approach  since  the  estimates 
across the two different approaches do not differ significantly. As a result, we can base 
our inference on the more efficient control-function method. 
5. Discussion 
In this section I discuss the interpretation of a significant party effect in Swedish local 
governments.  
The results of this paper strongly reject the notion of strict convergence, namely 
that all parties have similar preferred policy outcomes. However, one could argue that 
Sweden is not a two-party system and therefore the prediction about convergence from a 
model where two candidates competing for office does not apply. However, there are two 
arguments against this kind of reasoning. First, the prediction about convergence is a 
more general feature of political competition and not just exclusive to a two-candidate 
model.
42 Second, and more importantly, there are good reasons to treat Sweden “as if” it 
is a two-candidate system. As mentioned in section 3, Sweden has had a very stable two-
bloc system: socialist and non-socialist parties. The result from the empirical analysis is 
also quite consistent with the two-party view since the estimate of the party effect seems 
to be roughly constant across different specifications of the control function. In other 
words,  when  allowing  for  interactions  between  the  party  control  variable  and  the 
assignment variable the party effects seem to be roughly constant. Moreover, when we 
restrict the sample around the discontinuity to increasingly smaller intervals, we are at the 
same time reducing the number of municipalities that helps identify the party effect. For 
                                                 
42 See Osborne (1995) on this point.   19  
example, Table 9 reveals that in the +5/-5 interval there are 132 municipalities with an 
average  of  10.2  observations  per municipality,  while there are only 26 municipalities 
included in the +1.0/-1.0 interval with an average of 4.2 observations per municipality. 
These municipalities are governed by different coalitions of parties, left or right, where 
the relative party strength (as measured by vote or seat shares) can possibly be quite 
different within each government. Despite these differences in relative strength, the party 
effect seems roughly constant across the different sample (given sampling variability). I 
interpret this as quite strong evidence that one can treat the Swedish political system as a 
two-party system. In other words, it seems that inter coalition bargain in Swedish local 
governments does not depend on the included parties relative vote shares. 
The average party effect is also sizeable, about 2.5 percent of the budget or 1 
percent of average municipality income. The excess burden from changing the tax rate 
must clearly be non-trivial since all municipalities raise the bulk of their revenues through 
a  proportional  income  tax  rate  and  the  estimated  change  in  the  tax  rate  is  almost  1 
percentage point.  
  The finding of a large and significant party effect also raises the issue about the 
mechanism  that  makes  the  two  opposing  blocs  pursue  quite  distinct  fiscal  policies. 
Perhaps the most compelling answer is that parties cannot make binding commitments to 
their electoral platforms. This is the explanation set out by Alesina (1988) in an article 
where he criticizes the political science literature with outcome-motivated candidates. He 
shows that once one drop the commitment assumption the equilibrium outcome will be 
one  of  full  divergence.  The  only  credible  announcements  are  the  bliss  points  of  the 
parties.  Thus  if  left  and  right  wing  parties  have  different  preferences  over  policy 
outcomes we would expect to see a causal relationship between party control and fiscal 
policy outcomes, and therefore a rejection of policy convergence. 
Many scholars of local public finance hold the view that since voters can “vote 
with  their  feet”,  the  well  known  result  from  the  Tiebout  model  where  people  sort 
themselves into jurisdictions depending on their preference nullifies the importance of 
politics at the local level. The results of this paper constitute evidence against this view    20  
6. Conclusions  
This  paper  proposes  a  regression-discontinuity  method  to  resolve  the question 
whether party control matters for fiscal policy outcomes. The source of identifying the 
party effect comes from the discontinuity that the electoral rule induces at 50 percent of 
the vote share: if a party receives more than 50 percent of the votes it will be in office. 
Using panel data from Swedish local governments with several attractive features, I find 
strong evidence of a sizeable party effect: on average left-wing parties spend and tax 2.5 
percent more than right-wing governments, a difference of about 1 percent of average 
municipality income.   21  
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Table 1. Summary of party control  
Election period






1974-1976  117  125  35 
1977-1979  112  131  34 
1980-1982  123  118  38 
1983-1985  148  88  48 
1986-1988  127  105  52 
1989-1991  125  94  65 
1992-1994  74  172  40 
Sum 1974-1994  826  833  312 
a.  In Sweden there was an election every third year until 1994, when four-year-terms where introduced.  
 
Table 2. Frequency of government turnovers and vote shares 
 
Frequency of government 
turnovers
 
Number of governments  Average vote shares 
0  122  62.64 
1  30  57.69 
2  43  55.80 
3  41  53.84 
4  29  53.02 
5  13  52.90 
6  8  51.95 
7  0  - 
Note. - A government turnover is defined as a change of power between left-wing, right-wing or undefined 
governments.  The  calculation  of  average  vote  shares  only  includes  left-  or  right-wing  incumbent 
governments 
   25  
  
Table 3. Summary statistics for the fiscal policy outcomes and other covariates 
 
Variables  Mean  Standard d.  Min  Max 
Total 
expenditures 
28,257  5,804  14,391  70,031 
Current 
spending 
26,790  6,748  11,889  70,924 
Total revenues  28,207  5,699  15,515  71,699 
Income tax rate  16.46  2.12  9.7  31.75 
Left vote share  47.66  11.93  13.33  77.78 
Right vote 
share 
48.26  11.38  14.28  84.44 
Proportion of 
young, 0-15 
21.14  2.83  12.65  36.69 
Proportion of 
old, 65+ 
17.63  4.29  3.27  27.89 
Income, t  72,624  12,357  15,945  162,962 
Income, t-2  59,915  12,483  17,950  151,977 
Population size  29,774  52,551  2,865  692,954 
Population 
density 




2,114  2,192  -3,963  19,599 
Average income is expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices. 
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Table 4. The party effect: Total spending 

































































4          -.0024 
(.0015) 
[.0030] 



































Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.8343  0.8368  0.8386  0.8394  0.8395 
R
2 (within)  0.5898  0.5958  0.6005  0.6024  0.6026 
Number of 
observations 
5,913  5,913  5,913  5,913  5,913 
Note- Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. More conservative Huber-White standard 
errors allowing for clustering at the municipality level to account for possible serial correlation in the errors 
within municipalities are presented in brackets. 
   27  
Table 5. The party effect: Current spending 
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Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.8936  0.8967  0.8980  0.8981  0.8981 
R
2 (within)  0.8020  0.8078  0.8101  0.8103  0.8104 
Number of 
observations 
5,913  5,913  5,913  5,913  5,913 
Note- Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. More conservative Huber-White standard 
errors allowing for clustering at the municipality level to account for possible serial correlation in the errors 
within municipalities are presented in brackets. 
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Table 6. The party effect: Total revenues 
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[.0029] 



































Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.8401  0.8424  0.8446  0.8456  0.8457 
R
2 (within)  0.6044  0.6101  0.6155  0.6180  0.6182 
Number of 
observations 
5,912  5,912  5,912  5,912  5,912 
Note- Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. More conservative Huber-White standard 
errors allowing for clustering at the municipality level to account for possible serial correlation in the errors 
within municipalities are presented in brackets. 
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Table 7. The party effect: Income tax rate 
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[.0019]      
-.0054 
(.0039) 
[.0071]        
Left
3        1.59e-06 






4          -3.34e-07  
(2.87e-07) 
[5.12e-07] 




   (.011) 
[.022]     
.022 
(.037) 
[.079]       
-.105 
(.096) 
[.191]       
Right
2      -.00014 
  (.00011) 
[.00023]     
-.00075 
   (.00081) 
[.0017]     
.0038 
  (.0033) 
[.0064]      
Right
3        4.29e-06  




[.000091]       
Right





Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.9388  0.9404  0.9412  0.9412  0.9412 
R
2 (within)  0.8614  0.8650  0.8666  0.8667  0.8667 
Number of 
observations 
5,913  5,913  5,913  5,913  5,913 
Note- Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. More conservative Huber-White standard 
errors allowing for clustering at the municipality level to account for possible serial correlation in the errors 
within municipalities are presented in brackets. 
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Table 8. Party effect: Including other covariates 
Dependent 
variable 
I  II  III  IV  V 








































































Control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipality 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note- Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. More conservative Huber-White standard 
errors allowing for clustering at the municipality level to account for possible serial correlation in the errors 
within municipalities are presented in brackets. 
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Table 9. Party effect: Linear control function with and without interactions 
  Total spending  Current 
Spending  
Total revenues  Income tax 
rate 













































Control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipality effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note- Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. More conservative Huber-White standard 
errors allowing for clustering at the municipality level to account for possible serial correlation in the errors 
within municipalities are presented in brackets.   32  


















(Aver. obs. per 
municipality) 


























































































































Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Year effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Note- Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. More conservative Huber-White standard 
errors allowing for clustering at the municipality level to account for possible serial correlation in the errors 
within municipalities are presented in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 